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Abstract
When market structure is complete, factor demands by households will be
independent of their characteristics, and households will take their production
decisions as if they were profit-maximizing firms. This observation constitutes
the basis for one of the most popular empirical tests for complete markets,
commonly known as the “separation” hypothesis. In this paper, we show that
all existing tests for separation using panel data are potentially biased towards
rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete markets, because of the failure to ade-
quately control for unobservable individual eﬀects. Since the variable on which
the test for separation is based cannot be identifed in most panel datasets fol-
lowing the usual covariance transformations, and is likely to be correlated with
the household-specific eﬀect, neither the within nor the variance-components
procedures are able to solve the problem. We show that the Hausman-Taylor
1981 estimator, in which the impact of covariates that are invariant along one
dimension of a panel can be identifed through the use of covariance transforma-
tions of other included variables that are orthogonal to the household-specific
eﬀects as instruments, provides a simple solution. Our approach is applied
to a rich Tunisian dataset in which separation -and thus the null of complete
markets- is strongly rejected using the standard approach, but is not rejected
once correlated unobservable household-specific eﬀects are controlled for using
the Hausman-Taylor instrument set.
Keywords: panel data, household-specific eﬀects, household models, testing
for incomplete markets, development microeconomics, Tunisia.
JEL: O120, C230, D130, D520.
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One of the most widely-used empirical tests for the presence of market imper-
fections in developing countries is provided by the so-called “separation” hypothesis.
Numerous papers, including the seminal article by Benjamin (1992), have tested
the hypothesis that factor demands on a given plot of land will be independent of
household characteristics, when market structure is (almost) complete. The early lit-
terature is well summarized in Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986), while Udry (1996a)
covers the more recent literature as well as providing two careful applications to
African data.
Separation implies that the marginal productivity of inputs will be a function
solely of plot characteristics and prices, and that households take their production
decisions as if they were profit-maximizing firms. In contrast, when factor demands
are a function of household characteristics, marginal productivities are not equated
across households and production is ineﬃcient.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that: (i) in most cases, the standard
test for separation using panel data is biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis
of complete markets because of a problem of unobservable household-specific eﬀects;
(ii) the usual covariance transformations performed on panel data cannot solve this
problem; but (iii) the Hausman and Taylor (1981) estimator can. We show, using
a rich plot-level Tunisian dataset, that the null-hypothesis of complete markets is re-
jected using the standard approach, while it is not once correlated household-specific,
time-varying eﬀects are controlled for using the Hausman-Taylor estimator.
In a plot-level version of the test for separation, the equation being estimated on
agronomic data is given by:
(1) Yiht = Xihtα+ Zhtβ + εiht,
where Yiht is total labor usage (i.e., family and hired labor) on plot i, cultivated
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by household h, at time t, Xiht is a matrix of plot characteristics, Zht is a matrix
of household characteristics, and εiht is a disturbance term that satisfies the usual
Gauss-Markov assumptions. Separation is then associated with a simple F -test on the
exclusion restriction that β = 0. In the common expression of the test for separation
(Benjamin 1992), Zht is household size.
The main problem associated with this procedure is that the disturbance term
εiht can be decomposed into a nested error component structure given by:
(2) εiht = μt + λh + λht + ηiht,
where μt is a shock common to all plots and households at time t, λh is a time-invariant
household eﬀect, λht is a household-time eﬀect, and ηiht is a disturbance term that
satisfies the usual assumptions (see Baltagi, Song and Jung 2001).1 In most plot-
level datasets used in the literature, each household cultivates several plots. This
is a standard panel data framework, with one dimension being given by plots, the
second by households, and the third by time. Although λh can be accounted for
by a “within” procedure which transforms variables into deviations with respect to
their household-specific means (over all time periods), there remains λht. Since it is
probable that λht is correlated with Zht, the least-squares estimate of β, even after
the standard “within” transformation, will be biased with, in the scalar case:
(3) p lim βˆw = β +
cov[λht, eˆiht]
σ2e
,
where σ2e is the variance of the residual eˆiht from the auxiliary “within” regression of
household size on Xiht (see Hsiao 1986, p. 64, equation (3.9.3)).2 If cov[λht, eˆiht] 6= 0,
as is likely in the context of what is essentially a labor demand equation, then all
standard tests of separation are biased towards rejecting the null-hypothesis of complete
markets, when the “true” value of β is zero. One may therefore reject the null not
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because market structure is necessarily incomplete, but simply because of a banal
problem of unobservable heterogeneity. Another way of putting this is that, in the
standard test, the rejection of separation is conditional on the maintained identifying
assumption that λht is the same across all households at a given time t. It is very
likely that this assumption is violated.
The usual econometric response to a problem of unobservable individual hetero-
geneity in panel data is to apply one of the standard covariance transformations, such
as the “within” procedure. Here, this would involve expressing all variables as devi-
ations with respect to their household-specific means, at a given t. While, under the
assumption of exogeneity, this does allow one to recover unbiased estimates of α, it
has the regrettable side-eﬀect of eliminating the variable(s) upon which the test for
separation is based since, when one sweeps out λht, one also sweeps out Zht. Since it
is highly likely that λht is not orthogonal to Zht, random eﬀects are not an answer,
as they too will yield biased estimates of β.
Moreover, standard instrumental variables procedures, in which one would sim-
ply instrument for Zht, are not usually implementable. This is because admissible
exogenous instruments that would be correlated with Zht but are orthogonal to λht
are usually not available or, if they are, should probably already be included in Zht
for theoretical reasons.
The problem, which is similar in spirit to that of consistently estimating the
returns to education using panel data when schooling is correlated with the individual
eﬀects, can be solved using the Hausman-Taylor (1981, henceforth, HT) instrumental
variables estimator, which allows one to control for unobservable individual eﬀects
that are correlated with Zht, while allowing one to identify β.
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A simple household model
The Pareto-optimal baseline
The following model is in part inspired by Udry (1996b). A useful primer on house-
hold models is provided by Bardhan and Udry (1999). There are two types of family
members, men and women, and two types of hired labor, male and female. This
corresponds to the situation in the Tunisian village that will be the object of our
empirical analysis.
Consider a household, indexed by h, constituted by two members indexed by j =
M,F , that cultivates several plots of land, indexed by i = 1, ..., Ih. Individual j
consumes a quantity cjk of good k = 1, ..., K; c
j is therefore the 1 × K vector of
private goods consumed by individual j, whereas total household consumption is
given by the 1×K vector c = cM + cF . Total labor supply of individual j is equal
to Lj. Public goods produced within the household are given by Z. Preferences
of individual j are given by: U j = U j
¡
cM , cF , Z, LM , LF ,Ω
¢
, where Ω is a vector
of household taste shifters such as household demographics or wealth. Consider a
plot, indexed by i, that is cultivated in crop k. Then output on such a plot is given
by qki = F k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
, where Ai represents the characteristics of plot i,
including plot size, soil type and irrigation status, and Hji (L
j
i ) is hired (family) labor
of sex j used on the plot. Using the notation in Udry (1996b), where the set of plots
cultivated in crop k are denoted by P k = {i| crop k is grown on plot i}, the total
production of crop k by the household is given by:
(4) qk =
X
i∈Pk
qki =
X
i∈Pk
F k
¡
LMi , L
F
i , H
M
i ,H
F
i , Ai
¢
, k = 1, ..., K,
and the 1 × K vector of outputs of all goods is given by q = ¡q1, q2, ..., qk, ..., qK¢.
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Public good production within the household is given by:
(5) Z = Z
¡
LMZ , L
F
Z
¢
.
The time constraint of household member j is given by:
(6) Lj = LjZ +
X
i
Lji + L
j
W , j =M,F,
where LjW is household member’s j labor supply on the labor market. Finally, letting
p =
¡
pk, ..., pK
¢
denote the 1×K vector of prices, the household’s budget constraint
is given by:
(7) pc06pq0 − wM
X
i
HMi − wF
X
i
HFi + w
MLMW + w
FLFW + I,
where wj denotes the wage rate paid to hired labor of sex j, and I is non-labor income.
From the usual corollary to the First Theorem of Welfare Economics (see e.g. Varian
1978), and for any Pareto weight λ > 0, the intra-household allocation of resources
will be Pareto-optimal as long as it solves the problem:
(8) max
{c,L,H,P k}
UM + λUF s.t. (4), (5), (6) and (7).
Substituting the binding constraints ((4),(5) and (6)) into the objective function, and
letting μ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (7), the necessary first-order
conditions (FOCs) are then given by:
(9)
∂UM
∂cjk
+ λ
∂UF
∂cjk
− μpk = 0,
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for k = 1, ..., K, j =M,F ;
µ
∂UM
∂Z
+ λ
∂UF
∂Z
¶
∂Z
¡
LMZ , LFZ
¢
∂LjZ
+
∂UM
∂Lj
+ λ
∂UF
∂Lj
= 0,(10a)
∂UM
∂Lj
+ λ
∂UF
∂Lj
+ μwj = 0,(10b)
for j =M,F ;
∂UM
∂Lj
+ λ
∂UF
∂Lj
+ μpk
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
= 0,(11a)
μpk
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
− μwj = 0,(11b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih, plus the complementary slackness condition
from the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem.
Combining (10b), (11a) and (11b) then implies that the marginal productivity of
family labor of sex j will be equated to the marginal productivity of hired labor of
the same sex , and that these marginal productivities will be the same across all plots
cultivated by a given household, as well as between households:
(12)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
,
for k = 1, ..., K, j =M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih.
Market imperfections
The literature on household models is replete with examples of market imperfections
that lead to violations of the conditions that underly separability. In what follows,
we consider the most commonly appealed to market imperfections and examine their
consequences on the optimality conditions derived above. These include credit con-
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straints (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986; Feder 1985; Feder et al. 1990), labor market
imperfections (Lopez 1984; Benjamin 1992; Jacoby 1993; Skoufias 1994; Lambert and
Magnac 1994; Sadoulet, DeJanvry and Benjamin 1998; Sonoda and Maruyama 1999;
Bowlus and Sicular 2003), imperfect land rental markets or tenure rights (Gavian
and Fafchamps 1996; Carter and Yao 2002; Carter and Olinto 2003 on the interrac-
tion between land and labor market imperfections), imperfect insurance markets in
conjunction with imperfect labor and land markets (Barrett 1996; Kevane 1996), or
marketing constraints.
As noted by Udry (1996a), the separation result is robust to the absence of the
market for one of the factor inputs.
Credit constraints
Consider now the model given in (8), to which we append a working capital constraint
of the form wM
P
i
HMi +wF
P
i
HFi −wMLMW−wFLFW−I 6 B, where B is the working
capital available to the household. Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the credit constraint by ϕ, the ensuing FOCs imply that:
(13)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
µ
μ+ ϕ
μ
¶
wj
pk
,
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. This condition implies that the marginal
productivities of family and hired labor of sex j are equated across plots cultivated
by a given household. In contrast to the separable case, on the other hand, these
marginal productivities diﬀer between households, because of the presence of the
Lagrange multiplier ϕ, which is household-specific.
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Labor market imperfections
Consider now a constraint on the amount of labor that a household can "export" on
the labor market: LjW 6 L
j
W . Then, denoting the Lagrange multipliers associated
with these constraints by ψj, the ensuing FOCs imply that:
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
wj
pk
,(14a)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
− ψ
j
μpk
,(14b)
for k = 1, ..., K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. The first condition implies that the mar-
ginal productivity of hired labor will be equated across plots cultivated by the same
household, as well as across plots cultivated by diﬀerent households. The second con-
dition implies that the marginal productivity of family labor will be equated across
plots cultivated by a given household, but will not be the equated across households.
Moreover, the marginal productivities of family and hired labor will not be equated
within households.
Now consider a constraint on the other side of labor market that takes the form
of a limit on the amount of labor that the household can hire:
P
i
Hji 6 H
j
. Then,
denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with these constraints by ψj, the FOCs
associated with the problem imply that:
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
wj
pk
+
ψj
μpk
,(15a)
∂F k
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi , HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
wj
pk
,(15b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. These conditions are the mirror image
of those given in the case of labor exports. The first condition implies that the
marginal productivity of hired labor will be equated across plots cultivated by a
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given household, but will diﬀer between households. The second condition implies
that the marginal productivity of family labor will be equated across plots cultivated
by a given household, as well as between households. As with the constraint on the
labor export side, the marginal productivities of family and hired labor will not be
equated within households.
Marketing constraints
Consider now a constraint that takes the form of an upper bound Q
l
on the amount
of crop l that the household can sell. More formally, the constraint in question can
be written as
P
i∈P l
F l
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
−
¡
cMl + c
F
l
¢
6 Ql. Letting φl denote the
Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint, the FOCs that correspond to the
problem then imply that, for those plots on which crop l is grown:
(16)
∂F l
¡
LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
=
∂F l
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
=
μwj
μpk − φl
,
for k = 1, ...,K, j = M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. These conditions imply that the marginal
productivities of family and hired labor are equated across plots cultivated by a
given household in crop l, but that these marginal productivities will diﬀer between
households. For other crops k 6= l that are not subject to the marketing constraint,
the conditions given in the unconstrained case continue to hold.
Insurance market failure
Assume now that the production technology on plot i is given by:
(17) qki = F
k ¡θi, LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai¢ ,
10
where θi is a stochastic shock to production on plot i. If we denote the vector
of stochastic shocks aﬀecting all of the plots cultivated by household h by θh =
(θ1, θ2, ..., θi, ..., θIh) which is assumed to be distributed according to the joint proba-
bility density function (pdf ) g (θ) then the household’s optimization problem is given
by:
(18) max
{c,L,H,P k}
Eθh
£
UM + λUF
¤
s.t. (4), (5), (6) and (7),
where Eθh
£
UM + λUF
¤
=
R ··· R ¡UM + λUF¢ g (θ) dθ1dθ2...dθi...dθIh. In the ab-
sence of an insurance market that would allow the household to equate the marginal
utility of its consumption across states of nature, the associated FOCs which implic-
itly define optimal labor inputs will then be given by:
Eθh
"µ
∂UM
∂cM1
+ λ
∂UF
∂cM1
¶Ã
∂F k
¡
θi, LMi , LFi ,HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Lji
− wj
pk
!#
= 0,(19a)
Eθh
"µ
∂UM
∂cM1
+ λ
∂UF
∂cM1
¶Ã
∂F k
¡
θi, LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
∂Hji
− w
j
pk
!#
= 0,(19b)
for k = 1, ...,K, j =M,F, i = 1, ..., Ih. The upshot is that insurance market failure
implies that optimal input use on plot i is a function not only of plot i’s characteristics
but, through the marginal utility of consumption ∂U
M
∂cM1
+ λ∂U
F
∂cM1
, of the characteristics
of all of the plots cultivated by the household.
The tenancy market
Consider now a situation, as is the case in the Tunisian village that will be the focus
of the empirical portion of this paper, in which there is an active land rental market
in which sharecropping and fixed rental contracts arise. Let
(20) P km = {i| crop k is grown on plot i under a contract of type m} ,
11
where m = OO (owner operator), RI (rented in), SI (sharecropped in), SO (share-
cropped out), and
(21) P n = {i|plot i is rented under a contract of type n} ,
where n = RI (rented in), RO (rented out). When a household rents in a plot i
under a sharecropping contract it retains a fraction αi of output and pays a fraction
βi of the costs associated with the plot; when it rents a plot in under a fixed rental
contract, it is residual claimant and pays a fixed rental equal to Ri; when it rents
out a plot under a sharecropping contract, it retains a fraction 1− αi of output and
pays a fraction 1 − βi of costs; finally, when a household rents out a plot under a
fixed rental contract, it receives a fixed rental payment equal to Ri. The household’s
budget constraint is therefore given by:
X
k
pk
¡
cMk + c
F
k
¢
6
X
k
⎛
⎜⎝
X
i∈PkOO∪PkRI
⎡
⎢⎣
pkF k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
−wMHMi − wFHFi
⎤
⎥⎦(22)
+
X
i∈PkSI
⎡
⎢⎣
pkαiF k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
−βi
¡
wMHMi − wFHFi
¢
⎤
⎥⎦
+
X
i∈PkSO
⎡
⎢⎣
pk (1− αi)F k
¡
LMi , LFi , HMi ,HFi , Ai
¢
− (1− βi)
¡
wMHMi − wFHFi
¢
⎤
⎥⎦
⎞
⎟⎠
−
X
i∈PRI
Ri +
X
i∈PRO
Ri + wMLMW + w
FLFW + I.
Note that the household chooses factor input use on those plots (i) that it culti-
vates as an owner-operator and (ii) that it rents in either under a fixed rental or a
sharecropping contract.
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Within-household ineﬃciency
Empirical implementation
The Hausman-Taylor instrument set
Let X1iht be those elements of Xiht that are uncorrelated with λht, while X2iht are
those that are; Z1ht and Z2ht are defined in a similar manner. The set of instru-
ments proposed by HT (1981), adapted to the three-dimensional panel structure, is
AHT = [QvtXiht;PvtX1iht;Z1ht], where Pvt and Qvt are the idempotent matrices that
perform the “between” and “within” transformations at time t, respectively.3 Under
the assumption that Xiht is uncorrelated with ηiht, QvtXiht is a legitimate set of in-
struments since E[(QvtXiht)
0ηiht] = 0. The basic intuition behind the HT estimator
is that only the λht component of the error term is correlated with [X2iht Z2ht], which
allows one to use QvtX2iht as instruments for X2iht, while PvtX1iht furnishes the in-
struments for Z2ht. The HT estimator therefore allows one to control for unobservable
correlated individual eﬀects, while allowing one to identify the parameters of interest
(β) in the context of testing for separation. A necessary condition for identification
is that the number of elements of X1iht be greater than the number of elements of
Z2ht (HT 1981, Proposition 3.2, p. 1385). These results have been extended by
Amemya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon, and Schmidt (1989) who suggest
a broader set of instruments that should improve eﬃciency. Their approach, however,
is only possible on balanced data, which is not the case in the dataset used in this
paper or, for that matter, in most plot-level agronomic datasets. Notice that the HT
instrument set is admissible only if exogeneity is satisfied. This is another potential
source of bias in tests for separation, but which is diﬃcult to address because of the
lack of admissible plot-level instruments in most datasets.
The three-dimensional nature of our dataset allows us an additional degree of
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freedom in terms of the definition of HT-type instruments. Above, we considered
orthogonality conditions of subsets ofXiht and Zht with respect to the individual-time
eﬀect λht. But the three-dimensional nature of the data also allows us to construct
instruments based on orthogonality conditions with respect to variables that have
been purged of their time-invariant household-specific component which is correlated
with λh. An advantage of this procedure is that, in empirical applications, the orthog-
onality of PvtX1iht with respect to the individual eﬀects could be suspect. Purging
PvtX1iht of its component that is correlated with the time-invariant individual ef-
fect, λh, should render it more palatable as a potential instrument set. In that case,
the set of HT-type instruments is given by
h
QvtX1iht;QvtX2iht; eX1iht;Z1hti, whereeX1iht = Qv(PvtX1iht) denotes the matrix of explanatory variables that have been
purged of their component which is correlated with λh. In other words, Qv = I − Pv
is the idempotent projection matrix that transforms variables into deviations with
respect to their household-specific means (over all time periods).4
We instrument contractual choice as .
Household characteristics
Reduced form estimates
The basic estimating equation is given by:
(23) Xjih = Aihδ + Ωhγ + ηh + εih, X = L,H, j =M,F.
plot characteristics are given by Aihδ =
m=MP
m=1
³
βmih
αmih
´
δm +
P
s
Ssihδs +
P
k
dkδk + TihδT
HausmanTaylor estimation cited by referee: Baltagi and Khanti-Akom (1990),
Cornwell and Rupert (1988).
Estimation of productivity diﬀerentials using panel data cited by referee: Deininger
and Olinto (2000), Gardebroek and Lansink (2003).
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In order to illustrate our fundamental point concerning the bias aﬀecting con-
ventional tests for separation in household models, consider the following standard
procedure implemented on a typical plot-level dataset. The data come from two sur-
veys (1993, 1995) carried out in the village of El Oulja, Tunisia (see Matoussi and
Nugent 1989, and Laﬀont and Matoussi 1995, for descriptions of the village). These
data display those properties discussed in the introduction: a Hausman test of ran-
dom household-time eﬀects (λht) versus fixed eﬀects in an empirical counterpart to
equations (1) and (2) strongly rejects (with a p−value below 0.001) the null of the
absence of correlation between λht and Zht. The bias identified in equation (3) is
therefore manifestly present in conventional tests of the null-hypothesis of complete
markets using this panel dataset.
For the purpose of HT estimation, we divide the explanatory variables into two
categories: (i) X1iht variables, assumed to be uncorrelated with λht, include four soil
type dummies and a dummy variable that indicates whether the plot is irrigated
or not, as well as a set of eight crop dummies;5 (ii) X2iht variables, assumed to be
correlated with λht, are given by the share of costs borne by the cultivator, divided
by the share of output received, for eight diﬀerent inputs, as well as log plot size in
hectares.6
The economic rationale for allowing the variables included inX2iht to be correlated
with λht is that they may, in the context of tenancy contracts (which account for 28
percent of the plots in the sample), be determined as the solution to a principal-agent
relationship between a landlord and a tenant, and would then be functions of tenant
characteristics, including those unobservable characteristics potentially captured by
λht. An additional, empirical, motivation for using the ratios of cost-shares to the
output share is that the data in question come from a single village and that the only
source of cross-sectional variation in eﬀective input prices stems from heterogeneity
in contractual form on plots under tenancy contracts. Plot size is also assumed to
15
be correlated with λht, as it too may be chosen by landlords for plots under tenancy
contracts. Both of these hypotheses will be subjected to a test of the corresponding
overidentifying restrictions below. Our single Z2ht variable is given by log household
size. In line with the usual methodology, the dependent variable is log total (hired
and family) labor usage on the plot, in person-days per hectare.7 Table 1 provides
summary statistics on all the aforementioned variables.
Estimation results are presented in table 2. Many households did not engage
in crop production in the second survey (1995) because of adverse climatic shocks;
this explains why the number of household-years (ht) is much smaller than twice
the number of households (h). Intercept, year dummy, and eight crop dummies are
included in all specifications presented in table 4 (no constant in col. (2)); random
eﬀects are rejected in favor of fixed eﬀects in columns (2) and (3) by Hausman tests
with associated p-values of less than 0.0001. The dependent variable in the estimation
results presented in table 4 is given by log person-days per hectare used on the plot.
The standard test for separation is presented in column 1, and yields an unam-
biguous rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets in that log household size
is highly significant at the usual levels of confidence (t−statistic = 4.55). In column 2,
we control for time-invariant household characteristics (λh) using the “within” trans-
formation: recall that the impact of household size can be identified here because we
have two years of data and household size varies over the two surveys. Note, despite a
substantial fall in the variance of log household size, which goes from 0.328 in levels, to
0.014 when expressed in terms of deviations with respect to household-specific means
(over both periods), that the estimated standard error is still reasonably small, with
the associated t-statistic being equal to 2.406. The time-invariant household fixed
eﬀects (λh) used here corresponds to the type of specification used by Udry (1996b),
table 3, column 2, for a labor demand per hectare equation estimated on the Burkina
Faso ICRISAT dataset. Again the null of complete markets is strongly rejected by the
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data (t−statistic = 2.56).8 In column 3, we present results which allow for random
household-time (λht) eﬀects: this specification, which also rejects the null of complete
markets, can however be dismissed on the basis of the corresponding Hausman test
in favor of fixed eﬀects, as mentioned above (p−value of the Hausman test is below
0.001). Of course, household-time (λht) fixed eﬀects would not allow one to test for
separation at all in that they would also sweep out the impact of household size.
In column 4, we present results corresponding to the eﬃcient HT estimator.9 The
results are striking. In contrast to what was found in columns 1 through 3, the null of
complete markets is not rejected at the usual levels of confidence: the point estimate
of the parameter associated with household size is statistically indistinguishable from
zero (t−statistic = 0.71).10 Moreover, the test of the overidentifying restrictions
does not lead one to reject, with a p-value equal to 0.545. In addition, the Shea
partial R2 (0.071 for the reduced form for household size) and the partial F -test
(p−value below 0.001) of the joint significance of the instruments indicate that we
are not facing a "weak instruments" problem.11 We also compute the test (Bowden
and Turkington 1984) based on canonical correlation, which rejects the null that
the smallest canonical correlation is zero (p−value = 0.002). Hall, Rudebusch, and
Wilcox (1996) show that IV estimators are not weakly identified if and only if all the
canonical correlations converge to non-zero limits. They develop a likelihood ratio
statistic for the null that the smallest canonical correlation is zero.
However, the Hansen test is potentially inconclusive insofar as this test is based on
the strong assumption that at least as many instruments as the number of elements of
Z2ht are exogenous. As the Hausman-Taylor procedure is very sensitive to the choice
of the variables included in X1iht and X2iht, we compute the "diﬀerence Hansen"
statistic which enables us to test the validity of subsets of instruments (Hayashi 2000).
To that end, we first implement the HT estimator using eX1iht in addition to the basic
matrix of instruments used earlier. Second, we test that the subset of instruments
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PvtX1iht satisfies the orthogonality conditions. The "diﬀerence Hansen" statistic
presented in table 2 does not lead one to reject the null hypothesis that the specified
variables are admissible instruments (p−value = 0.676).12
The upshot is that, in stark contrast to the usual approach which does not con-
trol for unobservable individual eﬀects, HT estimation leads to the non-rejection of
the null-hypothesis of complete markets. Moreover the consistency of the HT-based
results presented in column 4 is ensured, in that they are not rejected by the tests of
the corresponding overidentifying restrictions and the diﬀerence Hansen test.
Local or selective separability
Divide plots that correspond to households in diﬀerent classes depending upon their
participation in labor and tenancy markets and estimate reduced form separability
equations on each class while controlling for selectivity bias.
Estimating marginal productivity
Estimate a translog production function and test the restrictions on the equality of
marginal productivity explicitly
Latent variable approaches
Allow data to sort observations into separable and non-separable classes
Concluding remarks
This article has shown that the rejection of the null-hypothesis of complete markets
in household models, based on the widely-used test of the exclusion restrictions im-
plied by separation, can be entirely due to the bias stemming from uncontrolled-for
unobservable individual heterogeneity. Our results are particularly important for
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plot-level panel datasets where no time dimension is present, since there is no means
at all, apart from the HT estimator, of testing for separation while controlling for
unobservable individual eﬀects (i) if the latter are correlated with the household-level
variable that is the focus of the test, and (ii) if no exogenous instruments are avail-
able. As was the case with the dataset considered in our empirical illustration, both
of these conditions are likely to hold in practice.
The implications of our results are, moreover, suggestive, in that there may be
other received results in applied microeconomics, based on panel data, to which the
HT estimator could be fruitfully applied. An obvious example is constituted by tests
of the precautionary savings motive, in which empirical measures of the risks faced
by households are usually time invariant, and in which no attempt is made to correct
for unobservable individual eﬀects.
Our results bring the methodology of testing for separation using panel data into
sharper focus. This is because we do not reject the null hypothesis of complete mar-
kets, conditional on λht. If one estimates a labor demand function on US individual
firm data, as in Griliches and Hausman (1986), one finds correlated individual firms
eﬀects, as we have found here for households. Thus, by analogy, profit-maximizing
behavior by firms is not incompatible with correlated individual eﬀects. However, in
our dataset, since labor demand is a function λht, it is not independent of household
characteristics per se, although they are unobservable characteristics. Another way of
putting this is that, in most panel datasets, testing for separation will undoubtedly
uncover correlated individual eﬀects. If separation is taken in its strictest sense to
mean that factor demands should be independent of household characteristics, un-
conditional on λht, then we do in fact reject the null-hypothesis of complete markets.
The key point here revolves around what type of household characteristics fall under
the λh and λht headings. If they are made up of household characteristics that only
aﬀect labor demand through their impact on the production technology, and the null
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of separation is not rejected, then the concept of conditional separation has meaning-
ful operational content. If the first condition is not satisfied, testing for separation
in agricultural household models becomes largely devoid of meaning.
A final point concerns the use to which tests of the separation hypothesis are
put. Any structural interpretation, in terms of which market failures are binding, of
the pattern of violations of separation based on observable household characteristics
(and thus on those elements of β which are statistically diﬀerent from zero) will
probably be biased unless unobservable individual eﬀects are controlled for using the
Hausman-Taylor estimator.
20
Notes
1λh represents, for example, time-invariant unobservable household characteristics
linked to productivity, whereas λht corresponds to transitory unobserved household-
specific shocks, that aﬀect both household composition and the average level of human
capital in the household. Our null-hypothesis of separability implies that we are for-
mally assuming that λh and λht are household characteristics that could legitimately
aﬀect the production technology and therefore labor demand. More on this issue
below, in the conclusion.
2There is a corresponding matrix expression when Zht involves several household
characteristics.
3For simplicity of exposition, we express the instrument set as if the data were
balanced. In the empirical application, the unbalanced nature of the data will, of
course, be taken into account.
4Note that the three-dimensional nature of our dataset allows us to use other
combinations of our exogeneous explanatory variables. They are not considered
here.
5The soil types are clay, red, sandy and barren, with mixed soil types being the
excluded category; the crop dummies are other cereals, potatoes, onions, garden
vegetables, tomatoes, beetroots, melon and fodder; the excluded category is wheat.
We also include a year dummy.
6The output and cost shares both equal 1 on plots cultivated by owner-operators.
Values strictly less than or greater than one of the ratio obtain on plots under share
tenancy contracts.
7Note that there are no Z1ht variables in this specification.
8A household-specific random eﬀects specification (λh, not presented) is strongly
rejected by the corresponding Hausman test.
9We also allowed the covariance matrix of the disturbance term to have household
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cluster eﬀects. Such a covariance matrix has the advantage of being flexible, by
allowing for arbitrary intra-cluster correlation and heteroskedasticity at the household
level. We thus relax the assumption that the correlation within each cluster is constant
and has a nested form. Obviously, our less restrictive specification may lead to some
losses in terms of eﬃciency.
10Note that all other point estimates presented in column 4 are fairly close to those
obtained using household-specific fixed eﬀects in column 2, except for that associated
with the irrigated plot dummy and the seeds cost share.
11The Shea partial R2 takes the intercorrelations among the instruments into ac-
count.
12Obviously, testing our subset of overidentifying restrictions is only valid if theeX1iht variables are uncorrelated with household-time eﬀects. However, as explained
above, this assumption seems to be justified from the theoretical standpoint.
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Table 1: Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on Exclusion Restrictions on
Household Demographic Characteristics
Authors Dataset Exclusion Estimated Separability
restrictions equation(s) Global Local
Pitt and Indonesia, Family morbidity (no. Farm profits Not Not
Rosenzweig, 1986 1978/86 of sick days) rejected tested
Deolalikar, 1988 India, Hh. size and Farm outputs Rejected Not
1976/78 weight-for-height tested
Benjamin, 1992 Java, Hh. size and Hh. labor Not Not
1980 composition demand rejected tested
Bowlus and China, Hh. size and Hh. labor Rejected Not
Sicular, 2003 1990-1993 composition demand tested
Grimard, 2000 Côte d’Ivoire, Hh. composition Farm labor Rejected
19XX demand
Lopez, 2004 Canada, Rejected
1970 (agg. data)
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Table 2: Tests of the Separation Hypothesis Based on Exclusion Restrictions on
Household Demographic and Other Characteristics.
Authors Dataset Exclusion Estimated Separability
restrictions equation(s) Global Local
Benjamin, 1994 Java, Area harvested Farm output,
1980 (previous year) labor demand
Carter and China, Land-labor Labor demand Rejected Not
Yao, 2002 1988, 1993 endowment ratio tested
Carter and Paraguay, Land property rights Cap. invest. Not Not
Olinto, 2003 1991, 94 demand tested tested
Feder China, Liquid assets, hh. size, Output supply Not Not
et al, 1990 1987 size of hh. labor force tested tested
Udry, 1996 Burkina Faso, Hh. size, non-farm Plot output, Rejected
1981-85, Kenya, wealth, total area plot labor
1985-87 on other plots demand
Sadoulet Mexico, Hh. endowment of Labor Not Not
et al, 1998 1994 unskilled and skilled intensity tested tested
labor, hh. migration
assets, assets aﬀecting
utility
Kevane, 1996 Sudan, Wealth, land and Yield per
1990 labor endowments hectare
Gavian and Niger, Hh. manpower, Qty. manure Rejected
Fafchamps, 1996 1990/91 proxies for hh. wealth on field
Vakis et al, 2004 Peru, Hh labor endowment Hh.’s on-farm Rejected Not
1997 and cons. chars., hours work rejected
worked oﬀ-farm
27
Table 3: Summary Statistics, ElOulja, Tunisia (447 Plots (i), 150 Households (h),
196 Household-Years (ht))
Mean Median Std. dev.
Person-day labor input per hectare (Yiht) 190.860 119.0 253.271
Plot characteristics (X1iht)
Soil type 1 (clay) 0.190 0.0 0.393
Soil type 2 (red) 0.201 0.0 0.401
Soil type 3 (sandy) 0.446 0.0 0.497
Soil type 4 (barren) 0.058 0.0 0.235
Irrigated plot 0.882 1.0 0.322
Contractual terms (X2iht)
% of costs paid by the cultivator
% of output accruing to the cultivator for:
Manure 1.008 1.0 0.121
Chemical fertilizer 1.016 1.0 0.145
Irrigation 0.999 1.0 0.150
Plowing 0.984 1.0 0.250
Family labor 1.063 1.0 0.243
Hired labor 1.041 1.0 0.230
Seeds 1.008 1.0 0.094
Transportation 1.006 1.0 0.171
Surface of plot in hectares 5.615 1.5 13.535
Household size (Z2ht) 8.257 7.0 5.117
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Table 4: Labor Demand Equations: Pooling, Fixed Eﬀects, Random Eﬀects, and
Hausman-Taylor Estimators (447 Plots (i), 150 Households (h), 196
Household-Years (ht))
Mean of dep. var. = 3.825 Pooling Fixed Random HT
eﬀects λh eﬀects λht (eﬃcient) λht
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Household characterstics (Z2ht)
Log household size 0.571
(4.55)
0.943
(2.56)
0.516
(3.12)
0.404
(0.71)
() () () ()
() () () ()
() () () ()
() () () ()
() () () ()
Plot characteristics (X1iht)
Soil type 1 (clay) −0.013
(−0.04)
0.206
(0.66)
0.184
(0.60)
0.248
(0.60)
Soil type 2 (red) −0.467
(−1.40)
−0.304
(−1.07)
−0.471
(−1.60)
−0.510
(−0.94)
Soil type 3 (sandy) −0.171
(−0.62)
−0.081
(−0.30)
−0.057
(−0.20)
−0.006
(0.02)
Soil type 4 (barren) 0.305
(0.84)
0.546
(1.48)
0.179
(0.46)
0.633
(1.2)
Irrigated plot 0.577
(1.92)
0.415
(1.78)
0.412
(1.86)
1.017
(2.49)
Contractual terms (X2iht)
% of costs paid by the cultivator
% of output accruing to the cultivator for:
Manure 0.975
(1.31)
4.120
(4.33)
1.346
(1.48)
1.295
(1.14)
Chemical fertilizer 1.070
(1.49)
−0.685
(−0.79)
1.191
(1.39)
1.979
(2.34)
Irrigation −0.128
(−0.25)
1.826
(2.74)
0.233
(0.35)
0.539
(1.53)
Plowing −0.080
(−0.26)
−1.542
(−3.31)
−0.408
(−1.07)
−0.864
(−1.64)
Family labor 0.776
(2.38)
−0.080
(−0.15)
0.645
(1.36)
0.170
(0.38)
Hired labor −0.620
(−2.07)
−0.417
(−0.79)
−0.734
(−1.48)
−0.637
(−1.84)
Seeds −0.675
(−0.83)
−2.902
(−2.71)
−0.758
(−0.81)
0.279
(0.21)
Transportation −1.074
(−1.94)
−0.981
(−1.71)
−1.403
(−2.58)
−1.494
(−2.71)
Log surface of plot in hectares −1.008
(−11.10)
−0.474
(−5.70)
−0.816
(−11.59)
−0.681
(−6.20)
Crop choice hazard rate
() () () ()
Joint signif. of cost shares: F -statistic
[p−value]
4.96
[0.001]
4.20
[0.000]
16.00
[0.042]
29.15
[0.000]
R2 0.6934 0.6558 0.6856 n.a.
Test of overid. restrictions
[d.f., p−value]
n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.805
[12,0.545]
Shea Partial R2 for log household size n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.071
Canonical correlation n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.053
[0.002]
Diﬀerence Hansen test
[d.f., p−value]
n.a. n.a. n.a. 10.214
[13,0.676]
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